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Introduction 
 
Though you believe in the accuracy of the scholastic 
knowledge, 
it will not open your inner eyes to invisible existence.1 
Rūmī  
 
This paper aims to introduce and discuss some preliminary aspects of 
mystical experience by examining the specific methodologies proposed 
by two celebrated figures of twelfth and thirteenth century Persian 
Sūfīsm, Shihab al-Dīn Yahyā al-Sūhrawardī and Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. It 
will focus on their critical exposition of ‘inner’ knowledge as opposed to 
knowledge by pure reason. The learned scholar and philosopher mystic 
of Persian descent, Sūhrawardī, sought to unify scholarly differences 
and to identify one common trajectory of wisdom from which both the 
Greek and the Persian were descended. While making a clear break 
from the Peripatetics and philosophers of reason before him, he 
expounded upon the importance and primacy of direct mystical 
experience as the only means through which one may transcend the 
object/subject divide. Following the short life of Sūhrawardī, the great 
Persian mystic and poet, Rūmī, brought with him a continuation of the 
idea of religious unity and the belief that direct mystical experience 
takes precedence over and above reasoning alone. His monumental 
work, the Mathnawī represents the culmination of Sūfī experience and 
wisdom and is a landmark work for later Sūfīs in its expression of the 
heights of mystical knowledge. The central focus on unity of being, 
which comes to its theoretical fulfillment in Ībn Arabī, sits at the heart of 
the legacy of these two masters. Addressing the dilemmas of the 
                                                
1 Jalāl al-Dīn Muhammad Balkhi, Mathnawī, a critical edition by Muhammad 
Este’lami, 6 volumes, Tehran, 1991, MVI /263. In subsequent citations ‘M’ 
refers to the published text and Roman numerals referring to the book. 
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diversity of thought and the ultimate aim of spiritual union and fulfillment 
of being, it has particular importance for the tradition of Persian Sūfīsm. 
 
On the subject of knowledge, this paper will discuss two forms of 
‘knowing’ that are peculiar to the phenomenon of religion: ‘inner 
or hidden knowledge’ as opposed to ‘apparent knowledge.’ In the 
Sūfī tradition these two forms of knowledge are referred to, 
respectively, as ‘ilm al-bātin and ‘ilm al-zāhir. The term bātin, 
refers to that which is at the base or the inner core or the very 
heart of things, and zāhir simply indicates that which is, or 
appears to be transparent.  
 
It is necessary to first clarify the terminology used to express 
inner knowledge: in particular, the terms ‘gnosis’ and ‘esoteric’ 
have caused much debate in the scholarly world concerning their 
application and meaning.2 In terms of a practical mysticism, the 
term ‘esoteric’ represents hidden and protected knowledge that 
requires a level of initiation and guided intuition; it is not subject 
to normative means of learning. The term ‘gnosis,’ then, refers to 
experiential knowledge and the realisation of the truth, which 
otherwise remains hidden or esoteric. Gnosis is sacred because 
it refers to the highest realization of one’s existence.  
 
It is also important to clarify what ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ is being 
discussed. There are many forms of knowledge. Secondly, the 
terms ‘esoteric’ and ‘gnosis’ can be used interchangeably to 
imply any form of privileged knowledge. For example, a simple 
feat of carpentry demonstrates the very complexities of the 
nature of esotericism and of knowledge. The building of common 
household furniture is not as simple as it appears, especially if 
one has no knowledge of carpentry. Even for the apprentice 
carpenter, theoretical knowledge of carpentry is put to the test 
                                                
2 See Antoine Faivre, ‘Quotations of Terminology Proper to the Study of 
Esoteric Currents in Modern and Contemporary Europe,’ and Wouter J 
Hanegraaff, ‘On the Construction of ‘Esoteric Traditions,’’ in Western 
Esotericism and the Science of Religion, A Faivre and W J Hanegraaff, editors, 
Belgium, 1998, 1-10 and 11-61. 
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against the realities of the ‘practice of carpentry.’ Many mistakes 
are made before the art is mastered and the desired article 
produced professionally. In any case, the type of knowledge that 
the esoteric represents (or protects) is ‘experiential knowledge,’ 
or ‘knowledge by experience.’ The possessor of gnosis is, in this 
instance, one who is by necessity a practitioner par excellence of 
a certain discipline. In other words, gnosis cannot be achieved in 
theory, but only through strict observance of the principles and 
disciplines of the way or method of one’s practice.  
 
A core premise in Islāmic theology maintains that ‘certainty’ is 
the condition of true knowledge and proper insight is only gained 
by way of three specific and necessary stages. It is believed that 
before one can achieve true knowledge one first needs to follow 
a strict discipline of practice. This is called ‘Ilm al-Yaqeen or the 
‘certainty of practice.’ After this, one will arrive at a proper vision 
or clarity of thought, a stage referred to as Ayn al-Yaqeen or the 
‘certainty of seeing.’ The final stage is defined by experience, this 
is called Haqq al-Yaqeen or the ‘certainty of truth.’ It is from 
these basic principles that the two main figures under discussion 
expound upon their mystical vision and epistemology. Shihab al-
Dīn Yahyā b. Habāsh b. Amirak, Abu’l-Fūtūh al-Sūhrawardī 
(1154-1191) and Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Mohammed Balkhī- i 
Rūmī (1207-1273) have written extensively on the concept of 
experiential knowledge, though via different methodological 
avenues. 
 
A brief overview of Sūhrawardī and Rūmī in a Sūfī context 
 
Sūhrawardī and Rūmī both fall into the period of Sūfīsm that is 
characterised by its speculative drive and by a preoccupation 
with the attributes of gnosis and love. Each figure is further 
defined by distinct methodological approaches to Sūfīsm. Where 
Sūhrawardī would typically fall into the rational or philosophical 
realm and is, therefore,  obviously an advocate of gnosis, Rūmī 
focuses on the principal of love through the realm of poetry. 
These are, however, technical, scholarly distinctions and both 
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Sūhrawardī and Rūmī transcend their own methodology in their 
appeal to spirituality and the true heart of Sūfīsm. In short, the 
way or method, for these two figures, is only the means to the 
Truth, after which naught but the Truth itself remains without any 
trace of the seeker (as idealised within the concept of fanā). 
A primary teaching that pervades Sūfīsm is the constant warning 
of the individual regarding trap/s (and demands) of the nafs.3 The 
entire depth and breadth of Sūfī spirituality is encapsulated in 
this fundamental precept and expressed in a variety of ways by 
Sūfī masters through the ages. This teaching is comprised of two 
doctrinal components that form the basis of Sūfī practice: self-
examination (mohāsebeh) as formally instigated by al-Mohāsibī 
(d.857) and chivalry (javānmardī)4 a rich tradition given particular 
spiritual impetus as a result of the rise of Islām. Sūfīsm, which 
was from its inception motivated by love (eshq) for Absolute 
Being (Allāh, Haqq, Hū) crystalised into two living traditions of 
thought: the school of Baghdad (sobriety) and the school of 
Khorāsān (drunkenness). The latter is the dominant form of 
                                                
3 Expressed in psychoanalytical terminology as the ‘ego,’ it is more accurate to 
understand the term to imply the ‘base self.’ However, the concept does not, in 
the Sūfī paradigm, denote something that is entirely a component of evil nor is it 
necessarily associated with matter as its source. Two notions that help us deal 
with the complexities of the principle of the nafs are in a sense ‘corruption’ (of 
the soul) and ‘forgetfulness’ (of its divine origin). The idea of the nafs and its 
various stages is based on the Qūr’an and is expounded upon by Sūfī masters 
explaining the progressive stages of the ‘soul’ (ar-ruh) with which the term nafs 
is often exchangeable with. For the outline of the stages of the nafs see 
Annemarie Schimmel, ‘Islām,’ in Historia Religionum, C J Bleeker and G 
Widengren, editors, Leiden, 1971, 180; and J Nurbakhsh, Sūfī Psychology, 
London, 1983, 51-59. 
4 Javaanmardi or ‘spiritual chivalry’ as it is better translated (which overlaps 
somewhat with the practice of ādāb), is the adherence to a set of ethical codes 
by the individual that make up the core discipline of Sūfī practice, in this 
instance. For an extensive discourse on the history and practice of 
Javaanmardi see Karim Zayyani, ‘Javaanmardi dar aayne-ye tasawwuf,’ in Sūfī, 
Issue 50, March, London, 2001, 26-37; also see introduction to Hussayn Wa’iz 
Kashifi Sabziwari, Futuwat Namah-Yi Sultani, translated by J R Crook, Chicago, 
2000,  xxi-xxxi. 
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Persian Sūfīsm and upholds the importance of ādāb5 over and 
above asceticism (zūhd).  
 
These various practical Sūfī doctrines often subtly overlap each 
other. However, Sūfīsm traditionally quotes a particular Hadīth of 
the Prophet, as an exemplar, in which the aim of Sūfīsm is 
concisely defined: man ‘ārafa nafsahū faqad ‘ārafa Rabbahū [‘he 
who knows his own self, knows his Lord’].6 This paper will mainly 
focus upon the notion of mohāsebeh and begin to clarify this idea 
and discuss in greater detail the structure and meaning of the 
methodologies of Sūhrawardī and Rūmī in light of the doctrine of 
self-knowledge.  
 
A point of departure in methodological approaches toward a 
hermeneutics of esotericism and the phenomenology of 
religion 
 
The ‘hermeneutics of esotericism’ is a methodological approach 
to the study of religion that aims to interpret esoteric texts, and 
their concepts, theories and principles on their own terms. Its 
primary concern is to treat ‘world religions’ not simply as a 
subject of social scientific research, but, as Eliade has put it, as 
hierophany (that is, manifestation of the sacred).7 The basic 
premise underlying this approach is the claim that religious texts 
and practices share a common core that is only separated 
methodically and socio-culturally in shaping individual ontological 
styles. As important as social science may be to the study of 
religion, an understanding of the nature of world religions, and 
especially their esoteric content, is predicated upon 
methodological approaches that look beyond methods which 
                                                
5 According to the Tāj al-‘arūs, a classical Arabic dictionary, adab (the singular 
of ādāb) is the ‘learning of the exercises of the carnal soul (nafs), the 
betterment of morals.’ See G S Reynolds, ‘The Sūfī Approach to Food: A Case 
Study of Ādāb,’ The Muslim World, Hartford, 2000, Vol 90, 199. 
6 Hadith Qudsi. 
7 See Mircea Eliade and Lawrence E Sullivan, ‘Hierophany,’ in The 
Encyclopedia of Religion. New York, 1987, 313-15. 
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focus only on social and cultural layers. Interpretation of texts 
and practices becomes central for a ‘hermeneutics of 
esotericism’; these elements act as a window to the definitive 
centre and essential being of a particular tradition. 
 
In light of this, there exists a great need for further scholarly 
appreciation of esoteric and mystical material as both the product 
and trigger of ‘hierophanic experience.’ Firstly, it is important to 
take note of Oldmeadow’s comment that ‘religious phenomena 
must be treated sui generis and not rammed into the theoretical 
straitjackets of reductionistic models of religion.’8 Secondly, as 
Oldmeadow points out in connection with Eliade, it is essential 
to: 
 
try to grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of 
physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art or 
any other study is false; it misses the one unique and 
irreducible element in it – the element of the sacred.9 
 
For instance, the performative and transformative character of a 
particular text remains inextricable from the ‘sacred’ 
understanding and connection that a particular ‘religious 
consciousness’ has with the said text. Examining such 
phenomena is the task of the ‘esoter[ic]ist’ of religion; and 
moreover, as I have asserted, by means of a ‘hermeneutics of 
esotericism’ that heads toward a phenomenology of 
[comparative] ‘esotericism’ ‘gnosticism’ and ‘mysticism.’  
 
Of course, this is not new. What I phrase ‘hermeneutics of 
esotericism’ is implicit and innate to the methodologies of 
Nicholson,10 Arberry,11 Corbin,12 Massignon,13 and Schimmel14 to 
                                                
8 Harry Oldmeadow, ‘Debating Orientalism,’ Australian Religion Studies 
Review, Vol 18.2, November 2005, 144. 
9 Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, New York, 1958, xiii. 
10 R A Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism, Cambridge, 1921. 
11 A J Arberry, The Doctrine of the Sufis. Kitab al-ta‘arruf li-madhhab ahl al-
tasawwuf, Lahore, 1966. 
12 Henry Corbin, Man of Light in Iranian Sufism, New York, 1978. 
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name but a few of the leading European specialists in Oriental 
scholarship who have opened up the avenues of learning and 
infinite possibilities of textual appreciation of the sacred content 
of mystical material of the East to the West. These gave rise to a 
revival of Western Esotericism of which the current exponents 
are Hanegraaff and Faivre.15 Esoteric knowledge of this kind 
continues to attract more serious attention in the East where the 
tradition is continued by the prolific scholars of the philosophia 
perennis and pre-eminent exponents of the traditionalist school 
such as Guenon,16 Schuon, Coomaraswamy, Suzuki, Ling, and 
Nasr.17 Although critiqued for their attack on the modernist 
position and for maintaining an elitist ambiance, their work 
remains an essential source for understanding the sacred.  
 
The Traditionalists, along with Eliade (who belongs to the Eranos 
School) and the above-mentioned Orientalists have played a vital 
role in the building the methodological approach to the study of 
‘the sacred’ within religion found in this paper. Their work is 
indispensable, for instance, in interpreting key themes that 
feature within and also define the Mathnawī of Rūmī and the 
‘Illuminationist Wisdom’ of Sūhrawardī. Both Sūhrawardī and 
Rūmī are axial points in Sūfī learning and history, and were 
important innovators in terms of methodological approach for the 
didactic tradition of mystical literature. The methodological 
                                                                                                       
13 Louis Massignon, The Passion of al-Hallaj: mystic and martyr of Islam, 
Princeton, 1982. 
14 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical dimensions of Islam, Chapel Hill, 1975. 
15 For an introduction to their work see Faivre and Hanegraaff, op cit.  
16 There is a need for further clarity concerning Guenon’s position among the 
‘Traditionalists,’ which will not be pursued here as it is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Briefly, although he was the first to publicly articulate the Traditionalist 
perspective and he is also associated with the school of thought through his 
earliest writings, key positions in Guenon’s thought as indicated by Trompf beg 
the question of his correct association with the school. See G W Trompf, 
‘Macrohistory in Blavatski, Steiner and Guenon,’ in Western Esotericism and 
the Science of Religion, op cit, 294-5; Oldmeadow, op cit, 145. 
17 For a good introduction to the Traditionalists and the idea of perennial 
philosophy see Harry Oldmeadow, Traditionalism, Colombo, 2000, and Jacob 
Needleman, The Sword of Gnosis, Baltimore, 1974. 
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approaches to comparative religion found with this paper are 
also indebted to these two great figures in Sufi thought.  
 
Sūhrawardī 
 
Opinions on Sūhrawardī vary between those who are strict 
admirers of his philosophical and scientific genius, and those 
who maintain the importance of his mystical or ‘allegorical’ 
treatises. The ‘Master of Illumination’ (Sheikh al-Ishrāq) as he is 
called, was the founder of an independent, non-Aristotelian 
school of philosophy named ‘the Philosophy of Illumination.’ He 
was born in the small town of Sūhraward in Persia 550/115418 
and met with a violent death by execution in Aleppo in the year 
587/1191 as a result of his increasing involvement in politics. 
However, during his relatively short life he managed to produce 
over fifty works, many of which remain unpublished. Sūhrawardī 
was educated in Persia under eminent masters of theology and 
philosophy and moved to Syria (Aleppo) where he tutored a 
number of late sixth/twelfth century rulers to whom he taught his 
controversial ‘Illuminationist political doctrine.’ Notable among 
them were Seljūk Sulaymān Shāh, who commissioned a number 
of Sūhrawardī’s works, and the son of the Ayyūbid Salāh al-Dīn 
(famously known as Salāddīn), the young prince al-Mālik al-Zāhir 
Ghāzī, the governor of Aleppo under whom Sūhrawardī met his 
death.  
 
Sūhrawardī’s deep appreciation of Aristotle lead him to a ‘re-
thinking’ of Arabic Aristotelianism. He was critical of what he saw 
as the endless inconsistencies and ambiguities of Aristotle who, 
Sūhrawardī felt, never clearly demonstrated his theory of intuitive 
knowledge nor ever systematically presented what constitutes 
the ‘intuitive mode.’ His concern with intuitive knowledge was not 
limited to the Greek sphere alone. Sūhrawardī was an advocate 
of what he called ‘ancient wisdom’ (Hikmat al-‘atīq), which was 
able to reveal  the truth that remains at the heart of all divinely 
                                                
18  Respectively Arabic and Christian dating. 
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revealed religions.19 Sūhrawardī attempted to bridge the gap 
between Islām and the pre-Islāmic philosophies of hermeticism, 
Pythagoreanism, neo-Platonism, and, in particular, between 
Islām and the wisdom of the ancient Persians.20 Sūhrawardī lived 
at a time when there was a need to re-unify the Islāmic sciences 
and to synthesise the myriad, contradictory schools of thought. 
Thus, his greatest contribution lay in his efforts to introduce an 
all-encompassing theory of knowledge that operated in parallel 
with his critique of the Peripatetics. 
 
Sūhrawardī’s underlying belief that philosophical discourse is a 
necessary part of one’s spiritual path is unique. This was 
revolutionary in light of the Sūfīs’ traditional rejection of 
rationalistic philosophy and the Peripatetics similar rejection of 
Sūfīsm. More precisely, Sūhraward ī’ aimed to harmonise 
intuitive knowledge (al-hikma al-dhawqiyya) with deductive 
knowledge (al-hikma al-bahthiyya).21 He does this by formulating 
his unified epistemological theory, which he called ‘Knowledge 
by Presence’ (‘ilm al-hūdūrī). This theory became his key method 
for arguing in favour of synthesising the diverse schools of 
thought and unifying them into a single philosophical paradigm.22 
Although philosophy occupied a privileged position in 
Sūhrawardī’s method, it has to be said that his entire 
methodology was informed, first and foremost, by the mystical 
experience. Therefore, his works can be divided into two 
categories: his philosophical epistemology and, more 
                                                
19 Mehdi Aminrazavi, ‘The Significance of Sūhrawardī’s Persian Sūfī Writings in 
the Philosophy of Illumination,’ in Leonard Lewisohn, editor, The Heritage of 
Sūfīsm: Classical Persian Sūfīsm from its Origins to Rūmī (700-1300), Oxford, 
Vol 1, 1999, 260. 
20 Ibid. See also Henry Corbin, Les motifs Zoroastriens dans la philosophie de 
Sohrawardi, Tehran, Vol 3, 1946 and Spiritual body and celestial earth: from 
Mazdean Iran to Shi’ite Iran, translated by Nancy Pearson, London, 1990.  
21Hossein Ziai, ‘al-Sūhrawardī,’ in The Encyclopaedia of Islām, Vol 9, Leiden, 
1995, 782b. 
22 Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in Islāmic Philosophy: 
Knowledge by Presence, New York, 1992, 43ff. 
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importantly, his ishrāqī (or theosophical) epistemology.23 
Sūhrawardī argued that philosophical epistemology of various 
modes and schools inevitably suffers from one major 
shortcoming: while they have their uses, philosophically based 
epistemological models (including his own) fall short of attaining 
certainty. Therefore, the rationalistic aspect of his theory of 
knowledge is important largely to the extent that his philosophical 
epistemology can be seen as an extended, supplementary 
commentary to his ishrāqī and esoteric works.24 
 
This is clarified in Sūhrawardī’s ishrāqī principles. ‘Certainty’ is a 
product of experiential knowledge and experiential knowledge is 
based on knowing ourselves. For Sūhrawardī this is the 
underlying axiom upon which cognition takes place and also 
what he believed the Peripatetics had previously ignored.25 This 
special mode of cognition, which he calls ‘Knowledge by 
Presence,’ attains knowledge directly and without mediation, 
going beyond the traditional subject/object divide.26  
 
The first stage of his ishrāqī epistemology, in essence, argues 
that there is an unconditional and unchangeable self that defines 
what individuals refer to as the ‘I’ but is also commonly 
misunderstood for the attributes that are conceptually or 
accidentally attached to it. Next Sūhrawardī explains that 
                                                
23 For an extended discussion on this subject see Amirnazavi, op cit, 267-269. 
24 This hypothesis is strongly supported by Amirnazavi and contrasts the sole 
emphasis placed on Sūhrawardī’s philosophical works by Ha’iri and Ziai. See 
Amirnazavi, loc. cit. It is argued by scholars Ha’iri and Ziai that Sūhrawardī’s 
philosophical works can be said to stand alone depending on the degree to 
which they are successful in offering ‘enlightenment’ to the adept via intellectual 
means. Sūhrawardī does not deny this as being possible. See Hossein Ziai, 
Knowledge by Illumination, Atlanta, 1990; Ha’iri, op cit.  
25 Amirnazavi, op cit, 265. On Sūhrawardī and the Greek tradition see John 
Walbridge, The Leaven of the Ancients: Sūhrawardī and the Heritage of the 
Greeks, New York, 2000. The tradition of self-knowledge extends back to the 
time of the Pre-Socratics, which carries through in Socrates and Plato. 
Sūhrawardī acknowledges that there is a break at Aristotle, but mostly argues 
that this is because the latter’s work has been largely misunderstood. 
26 Amirnazavi, op cit, 265-6 
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whereas proving the metaphysical self requires philosophical 
arguments, the attributes of the self (that are made up of worldly 
desires) are easy to identify. 27 He addresses this matter in some 
detail in his Sūfī writings. 
 
The second stage consists of the self revealing itself through a 
process of ‘unveiling.’ For this, Sūhrawardī prescribes some 
ascetic practices as helpful for attaining mastery over the 
individual ego and for allowing its false attributes to vanish one 
by one. Throughout this process the self, whose relationship to 
its attributes is likened to that of the accidental qualities of sugar 
(that is, its whiteness, and so on) to sweetness, begins to reveal 
its ‘I-ness.’28  
 
When you have made a careful inquiry into yourself you will 
find out that you are made of ‘yourself’ which is nothing but that 
which knows its own reality. This is your own ‘I-ness’ 
(ana’iyyatuka). This is the manner in which everyone is to know 
himself and in which everyone’s ‘I-ness’ is common with you.29 
 
This constitutes the principle foundation for a theoretical 
understanding of Unity of Being (wahdat al-wūjūd), wherein 
individuals are united in one common reality, that is, their ‘I-
ness’: though it is Rūmī who later takes this beyond its 
theoretical bounds in the ecstatic quotation, ‘there is no room in 
this house for two I’s.’30 Sūhrawardī no doubt understood this, 
but saw the essential role of philosophy as a useful tool for the 
realization of the ‘I’ and the fact that it is separate from its 
attributes. Sufi practices and ascetic techniques were then to be 
incorporated for the task of destroying the accidental qualities 
                                                
27 Ibid, 266. 
28 Ibid, 267. 
29 Ibid, source: Al- Sūhrawardī, Umar, Œuvres philosphiques et mysticques, Vol 
1, Tehran + Paris, Biblioteque Iranienne, 1331/1952, Opera Metaphysica et 
Mystica II, 112. 
30 Nicholson, The Mathnawī of Jalālu’ddīn Rūumī, Vol I, London, 2001, 167.  
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(such as worldly desires) and in finally achieving annihilation 
(fana). 31 
 
It is in this regard that Sūhrawardī’s ishrāqī doctrine offered the 
synthesis between discursive philosophy, intellectual intuition 
and practical wisdom. His theosophical epistemology is further 
elaborated in seven short treatises known as his Persian Sūfī 
writings. These are: Risālā al-Tayr (‘The Treatise of the Birds’), 
Awāz-i Par-i Jibrāil (‘The Chant of Gabriel’s Wing’), Aql-i Surkh 
(‘The Red Intellect’), Ruzi Ba Jami‘at-i Sūfīyyan (‘A Day Among 
the Community of Sūfīs’), Risāla fi Hālāt al-Tufuliyya (‘Treatise 
on the State of Childhood’), Risālā fi Haqīqat al-‘Ishq (‘Treatise 
on the Reality of Love’), and Lughat-i Murān (‘The Language of 
the Termites’).32 
 
These remain central works though which the heart of his 
Illuminationist Wisdom (Hikmat al-ishraq) is understood. 
Sūhrawardī confesses to this point in the introduction to his 
Hikmat al-ishrāq: 
 
The truth and the content of that [Hikmat al-Ishrāq] for me was 
not realized through intellection but through a separate means. 
Finally, having realized their truths [through illumination], I then 
sought to find their rational justification, however, in such a 
fashion that even were I to ignore [the rational basis of] these 
demonstrated propositions, no skeptic could ever cause me to 
fall into doubt concerning the truth of these things.33 
 
Sūhrawardī’s philosophical discourse arises from the need to 
explain the ‘certainty’ of spiritual experience in a rational and 
systematical fashion: he was by profession an adept philosopher 
and scholar.  
                                                
31 Amirnazavi, op cit, 267. 
32 A brief synopsis of these has been offered by Amirnazavi in his article, op cit, 
271-83. For their translation see W M Thackson, The Mystical and Visionary 
Treatises of Shihabuddīn Yahyā Sūhrawardī, London, 1982. 
33 Amirnazavi, source: Al- Sūhrawardī, Hikmat al-ishraq, translated by Sayyid 
Ja ‘far Sajjadi, Tehran, 1978, 18. 
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Rūmī  
 
The Persian poet, Rumi, was founder of the Mawlawiyya (or 
Mevlevi) order, known in the West as ‘the Whirling Dervishes,’ 
because of his reputation for suddenly falling into a romantic 
trance and whirling in the middle of the marketplace while 
reciting poetic verses. It was at the behest of his beloved student 
Hosamoddīn Chalabi (himself the head of an order of chivalry)34 
that the Mathnawī, Rūmī’s celebrated and most treasured work, 
was written down in order to collect the spiritual couplets that he 
would otherwise randomly recite. Of course, all of this was due to 
Rūmī’s ‘falling in love’ with the legendary ‘wandering dervish,’ 
Shams-i Tabrizi, who is celebrated in Sūfīsm as a great mystic 
with somewhat miraculous abilities. Before his meeting with 
Shams-i, Rūmī was already at the head of his father’s Sūfī 
school. After migrating from Balkh (in modern day Afghanistan), 
where Rūmī was born in the year 604/1207, his father (Bahā 
Valād) established his school at Konya at the request of the 
Seljuk Prince when Rūmī was still very young.35 After his father’s 
death, he completed his education in all the traditional Islāmic 
sciences including theology, jurisprudence, prophetic traditions, 
Islāmic philosophy and literature under the eldest member of the 
school. 
 
It was at the height of his career as a well-respected scholar that 
Shams-i entered his life. The famed exchange that took place 
between them is recited by Sūfī tradition as the example par 
excellence of the relationship between master and apprentice. In 
one story, it is told that Shams-i (who is described as jende-
poosh: a person who dresses in rags and looks no more than a 
beggar on the streets) speaks to Rūmī and inquires about the 
                                                
34 At a time when Hosamoddīn became a disciple of Rūmī, he was already the 
head of a local order for the training of young men in chivalry. Jawid Mojaddedi, 
The Masnavi: Book One, Oxford, 2004, xviii. 
35 A Bausani, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī,’ in The Encyclopaedia of Islām, Vol 2, Leiden, 
1995, 393b; also see Mojaddedi, op cit, xv. 
Milad Milani 
 
243 
important books from which he was teaching. Rūmī replied 
‘these books contain things you would not understand.’ Then, 
suddenly, the books caught on fire and Rūmī in astonishment 
demanded, ‘how did you do that?’, and Shams-i replied 
‘something you do not understand.’36 This is the legendary story 
that is associated with Rūmī’s introduction to the real world of 
gnosis which can never be attained through normative means of 
learning. Capturing this experience, Rūmī writes, ‘Though you 
believe in the accuracy of the scholastic knowledge, it will not 
open your inner eyes to invisible existence.’37 
 
To clarify, Rūmī deliberately sets up a duality concerning the 
nature of knowledge. The illustration is literal insofar as it is 
demonstrative of two distinct cognitive states; it is not, however, 
a literal description of two apparently factual worlds. As such, 
there are two main definitions of knowledge (or ‘ilm) in the 
Mathnawī: one is related to the visible and material world 
accessible through intellecual facilities, while the other is not 
worldly, not taught in schools and not accessible through books. 
This is often playful and entertaining as these modes are 
necessary in demonstrating the subtleties of inward knowledge. 
Like Sūhrawardī, the prerequisite for achieving the latter form of 
knowledge to first realise and accept that there is an ‘invisible 
world’ that one is not at present able to ‘see’ and which is the 
only real and eternal aspect of existence.38 Unlike Sūhrawardī, 
however, rather than philosophical discourse, Rūmī’s primary 
methodology is expressed through imaginative poesis. Rūmī 
therefore, makes significant appeal to the emotions39 and 
                                                
36 For other versions of their meeting (including this one) see Eva de Vitray-
Meyerovitch, Rūmī and Sūfīsm, California, 1987, 23ff.  
37 M VI/263. 
38 This is indicative of the proper state of mind of the seeker, in that the subject 
wishes to understand more than what is made manifest. In addition, this arises 
from the fundamental clause and first principle in Islāmic practice, which is the 
act of taslīm (or surrender [to God]).  
39 Emotion here infers the power of love, loving-kindness, compassion, mercy, 
fear, repentance, and so on.  
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imagination of his readers through which indispensable access is 
gained to the Spirit. In this respect, the Mathnawī is to be read 
and understood within a specific genre of ‘hierophanic history,’ 
which escapes the conventional parameters of both factual 
history and imaginative fiction, yet remains within the rational 
appreciation of both the realm of history and fiction. It is history 
insofar as events in the lives of adepts are deemed possible, and 
did, in fact, occur and it is fiction insofar as it operates according 
to the stereoscopic dynamics of poetic function.40 Most 
importantly, the Mathnawī serves to retain what is necessarily 
significant to ‘religious experience’ i.e. ‘spiritual biography.’ 
Therefore, figures of scriptural history, and other imaginative 
characters are specifically incorporated in order to engage the 
reader for didactic purposes.  
 
The way to the ‘invisible world’ for Rūmī is through the heart. 
Firstly, Rūmī believes that spiritual education opens a window 
upon an ‘invisible school’ inside an individual’s heart and upon 
the mysteries which are perceptible only through inner vision.41 
Secondly, Rūmī acknowledges the indispensable role of the 
spiritual guide or master (Pīr or Murshid) as being necessary for 
the illumination of one’s heart, though, like a good Muslim he 
maintains that it is above all upon the grace of God that one’s 
direction toward this path is based in the first place.  
 
Rūmī’s poetry makes contrasting illustrations of terms in order to 
highlight effectively the difference between the functional quality 
and capacity of inward knowledge and surface knowledge in the 
Mathnawī. He does this beautifully by the use of antonyms; and 
his famous anecdote of the boatman and the grammarian can be 
used to illustrate this here. The conceited grammarian, a nahwī, 
                                                
40 Victoria Kennick Urupshurow, ‘Hierophanic History and the Symbolic 
Process: A Response to Ricoeur’s Call for a ‘Generative Poetics,’’ in Religious 
Traditions, Vol 13, 1990, 48.  
41 Mohammad Este’lami, ‘The concept of Knowledge in Rūmī’s Mathnawī,’ in 
Leonard Lewisohn, editor, The Heritage of Sūfīsm: Classical Persian Sūfīsm 
from its Origins to Rūmī (700-1300), Vol 1, Oxford, 1999, 401-2. 
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one day embarked on a boat journey and asked the boatman: 
‘Have you ever studied nahw (‘grammar’)?’ The boatman said 
that he had never studied grammar, and the nahwī said to him: 
‘O! I feel so sorry for you, half your life has gone for naught.’ The 
boatman did not answer immediately and kept silent for a while, 
until the wind cast the boat into a whirlpool. Then the boatman 
shouted: ‘do you know how to swim?’ the proud grammarian said 
that he had never learnt to swim. The boatman said: ‘O Nahwī! 
Your whole life has gone for naught, because the boat is sinking 
in this whirlpool.’42 Following this anecdote Rūmī offers a further 
play on words to finalise his point,  
 
Here what is needed is self-effacement (mahw), not grammar 
(nahw).  
If you’re effaced from self, then plunge into the sea, 
and be not frightened of any peril or danger.43  
  
Self-effacement comes from the pursuit of education in the 
school of the heart. Here the study of fiqh or sarf or nahw 
transforms into the ‘jurisprudence of jurisprudence’ (fiqh-i fiqh), 
the ‘morphology of morphology’ (sarf-i sarf), and the ‘grammar of 
grammar’ (nahw-i nahw),44 placing emphasis on the knowledge 
that comes from within. Hence, the initial goal of the Sūfī adept is 
to first enter the realm of the heart and thereby illuminate his or 
her being. This concerns a central aspect in Sūfī practice that 
involves the constant purification and transformation of this 
psycho-spiritual organ. Obviously, the heart is not solely a Sūfī 
symbol. In invoking the heart, Rūmī primarily aimed to avoid the 
formal separations of linguistic, cultural or ideological boundaries 
and envoke a unitary and universal concept that would allow all 
people to embrace and adapt the Mathnawī. With the presence 
of Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians and Muslims in Konya, Rūmī 
recognised importance of demonstrating a harmonious centre to 
which all religious traditions belonged. In this approach, the 
                                                
42 M I/2835. 
43 M III/1124. 
44 Este’lami, op cit, 403. 
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Mathnawī occupies an Islāmic paradigm, but at the same time 
transcends it in its profound appreciation of the hierophanic 
experience of the Other to such an extent that it transcends 
normative religious appreciation altogether. Reminiscent of an 
invitation of Christ into one’s life, Rūmī maintained that it is, 
firstly, the opening of the gate in one’s heart which is necessary 
in inaugurating the spiritual journey. ‘Everyone in whose heart 
the gate is opened, will behold the sun from everywhere.’45 
Those hearts that remain closed and unaware remain in a 
constant state of imitation.  
 
Again, like Saint Paul, who would emphasise faith over religion, 
but firmly echoing the words of the Qūr’an, Rūmī also relates that 
‘the knowledge of real religion’ (‘ilm-i dīn)46 belongs to ‘the 
knowledge of the one who becomes aware of his heart’ (‘ilm-i 
ahl-i del) .47 In short, ‘worldly knowledge’ (or rather knowledge 
absent of the heart) is an obstacle on the road to the real and 
divine knowledge.  
 
Between the realizer and the imitator, 
there are many differences. 
The former is like David and the imitator 
is only an echo [not a song, not a singer].48 
 
Rūmī maintains that humankind was not created to satisfy its 
material side of being, but rather material being is a vehicle by 
which one should approach the frontier of Eternity.49 The point of 
the recurrent Sūfī theme of the nafs is, lastly, that humankind has 
become forgetful of its source of origin and remains a prisoner of 
                                                
45 M I/1409. For the use of Jesus in the Mathnawī, see J. R. King, ‘Jesus and 
Joseph in Rūmī’s Mathnawī,’ Muslim World, LXXX, No. 2, Hartford, 1990, 81-
95; For a detailed discussion on the subject of Jesus in Sūfī literature see Milad 
Milani, ‘An Analysis of the mystical significance of Jesus in Sūfī Literature,’ 
forthcoming. 
46 M I/1019. 
47 M I/3461; Este’lami, op cit, 405. 
48 M II/496. 
49 Este’lami, op cit, 406. 
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the physical self. So Rūmī recites, ‘The ear of the head is as 
cotton-wool in the ear of conscience, to open the inner ear, the 
ear of the head must become deaf.’50 
 
Conclusion 
 
The subject of mystical experience remains a source of 
fascination for the West, especially the field of study known as 
Sūfīsm. There is no doubt that there is something that drives the 
human soul to perfection, even though this may be, in reality, an 
unattainable goal. This very thing, this force or energy was 
described and put into words by the great mystics, who had 
recognised its potential, as love. Hence the theoretical 
construction of the realm of the heart in Sūfī literature and the 
constant reiteration of its distinguished ‘reality’ from its opposite 
force, the intellect (aql). The Sūfīs held ‘heart education’ in such 
esteem that their central identity and image was classically 
formed around the concept of a dervish51, which was deliberately 
contrasted to the monetary associations of intellectual or 
scholastic education. The dervish, by comparison, was the 
graduate of the ‘invisible school’ of the heart. As a result, the 
works of Sūhrawardī and Rūmī are especially important for an 
investigation into the nature and reality of mystical experience 
and inner knowledge as they contain much of the sacred 
knowledge that had been kept secretly within the oral tradition of 
Sūfīsm for many centuries. 
 
For an approach to the subject area I have here discussed only 
in brief the methodological technique that I believe to be most 
pertinent to an academic investigation of this style. I must stress 
again that the great labours of Nicholson, Arberry and Corbin 
have been a phenomenal step forward in this way and likewise 
the efforts of Eliade and the Traditionalists have also been 
                                                
50 M I/571. 
51 Literally ‘poor’ or ‘indigent,’ which was to be applied later on as a symbol of 
inner poverty or spiritual poverty.  
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paramount in achieving a closer appreciation of the esoteric and 
gnosiological content of mystical traditions.  
 
The central tenet discussed here is the idea that religious 
traditions of the world are not only accidentally (in the 
philosophical sense of the word) different but that they are 
connected at their core by a common thread of values and 
principles, which require proper means of academic attention 
and interpretation. As such, the ‘hermeneutics of esotericism’ is 
engaged in hierophanic history and interested in the meaning 
and value of the principles that underpin and give life to its 
practical and spiritual dimension. Therefore, adequate academic 
research and specialised attention aims to reveal core relative 
factors at the heart of religious practices that not only drive 
religious agencies but motivate religious experience as a whole.  
 
One such common factor related to spiritual practice I have 
introduced in this paper as ‘self knowledge.’ Its discourse 
stretches back into antiquity and it permeates the various 
canonical traditions today. Moreover, as I have demonstrated in 
this paper, it is a central tenet of both Sūhrawardī and Rūmī ’s 
mystical epistemology. The pursuit in self knowledge is not a 
promotion in the ego-self but rather its demotion from a state of 
attachment and pride in order to reveal the ‘real-self’ or the ‘non-
self.’ To return to the Hadith quote, ‘he who knows his self, 
knows his Lord,’ the individual in seeking his or her own self will 
come to find nothing substantial or permanent but God [the Real, 
the True (al-Haqq)]. 
 
